Despite the troubling silence of African, Islamic, and Western
leaders about the Kenya government’s brutal human rights violations
against the Somali community in Kenya for their ethnic background and
about its unlawful military and diplomatic actions in Jubba regions of
Somalia, a glimmer of hope emerged in April when two Nordic diplomats
renewed a focus on peace building and state-building in Somalia. Donor
Powers have been challenged to end the indirect rule, occupation, and
containment, and seriously support state-building in Somalia.
Continuation of current transgressive interactions between neighboring
and other foreign countries and Somali clan enclave and city presidents
and mayors flouts Somalia’s sovereignty, independence, and unity and
undermines state-building objective central to Somalia’s peaceful
existence and prosperity.
H. E. Pekka Havvisto, Minister of International Development of
Finland and Co-chairperson of the Forum for International Dialogue on
Peacebuilding and State-building (IDPS) and Jens Mjaugedal, Special
Envoy of Norway for Somalia have called on donor powers to effectively
honor their commitments for state-building in Somalia as mandated by UN
Security Council. Immediately, in dissension, Ken Menkhaus, professor of
political science at Davidson College in North Carolina, USA,
specialist on Horn of Africa and an affiliate of Nordic Africa Institute
in Uppsala, Sweden, came out forcefully against the wisdom and
viability of state-building in Somalia. Thus, the glimmer of hope for
state-building is under attack.
On April 10, at a roundtable discussion on peacebuilding and
state-building in the Horn of Africa held at Woodrow Wilson Center in
Washington, D.C., Pekka Havvisto has articulated the critical need to
implement the goals and principles of the New Deal for Engagement in
Conflict Affected and Fragile States agreed upon in Busan, Republic of
Korea, in 2011.
The five goals of the New Deal for state-building ,
namely political legitimacy and inclusivity, people’s security, system
of justice, economic foundations, revenue and fair delivery services,
have been developed through collaborative consultations between
international donors, g7+ (19 conflict affected and fragile states), the
international Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and Civil
Society Secretariats under the leadership of IDPS Forum. Furthermore,
the New Deal incorporates the five principles for Aid Effectiveness:
ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability
on the basis of normative relations between donors and recipients.
Minister Pekka reiterated the fundamental principles of the New Deal
which require countries and citizens of g7+ to take the lead and have
ownership of the process of state-building and adopt a social contract
(constitution) which binds the citizens and State. This ownership should
be manifestly respected and supported by donor powers.
Particularly for Somalia where the foundations of governance are
compledly missing, Minister Pekka contended that the constitution making
process, the strong interests of neighboring countries in Somalia and
the international community’s limited interest in security did undercut
the takeoff of the New Deal. To preempt any possible question over the
primacy between informal and formal institutions, he asserted that both
institutions exist side by side in the Horn of Africa countries. In
summary, his message was to promote the understanding and adoption of
the New Deal for fragile states.
On April 17, in
conversation
with Peter Fabricious, foreign editor of Independent Newspapers in
South Africa, Norway Special Envoy for Somalia Jens Mjaugedal repeated
the views expressed by the Minister of Finland. He was particularly
disturbed by how donor powers were far from grasping the reality of
Somalia and wasting precious time in discussing issues peripheral to
state-building in a warzone. He unambiguously suggested that donor
powers need to conduct internal triage before they embark on
state-building. He pointed out that the funding of UN programs is not
contributing to the vital overall aim of establishing the capacity,
credibility, and relevance of the Somali government.
For example, he cited that the Somali government is unable to pay
salaries to eight thousand civil servants because donor powers did not
disburse one dollar out of the $2.3 billion pledged at Brussels
Conference in September 2013. It is also hard not to despair in the face
of the level of suffering subjected to the Somali National Army who
carries the burden of the war against Al Shabab. Somali Soldiers do not
get the one twelfth (1/12) of the stipend regularly paid to each AMISOM
soldier. At the same time they are deprived of basic care even in case
of casualty.
Jens Mjaugedal did not advocate the release of large sum or Marshall
Plan. He appealed for the release of less than 5 % of $ 2.3 billion. The
three-year new deal pledge is far less than a two year Capital Appeal
Process (CAP) budgets used to be managed exclusively by International
Aid Agencies as caretaker government for Somalia in the past 20 years.
Jens Mjaugedal stated that “Somalia is the one of the most privatized countries in the world,”
which means Somalia is without State authority. Similarly, Professor
Michael J Boyle said that Somalia’s conflict has been globalized. Thus,
state-building in Somalia is an urgent matter for the purpose of
international peace and security. History will remember the Nordic
diplomats for their bold actions of bringing the true reality of Somalia
to the attention of everyone. Somali leaders failed to reflect and act
upon the reality of their people and country.
With regard to the endemic corruption labelled against Somali
leaders, the source is from the anti-state-building strategy pursued by
powerful foreign actors involved in the internal politics of Somalia.
Today, majority of the Somali people believe that they lost control,
ownership, and freedom of determining their own future to outside
forces. This feeling could produce disastrous backlash for all.
Before presenting and commenting the dissenting argument of Professor
Ken Menkhaus, I like to mention below three instructive points the
General Secretary of the g7+, Helder da Costa, made in a
letter published in the guardian newspaper in April 2014 under the title
“New Deal for fragile states needs time and political commitment to flourish.”
- The New Deal demands fundamental changes in the modus operandi of
donor powers and the way they work in fragile countries. It details
principles, commitments, and actions. The practice of risky taking,
speedy actions, flexibility, persistence, and creativity are proviso in
it.
- The “better angels” working in the development agencies know the
positive effects of the New Deal, but they remain stuck to their
institutional culture stubbornly resistant to changes;
- Genuine state-building demands great investment of time, resources and political will.
On 29 April,
Professor Ken Menkhaus published his dissenting
policy note probably intended to delight the US Administration
concerned with security and not with state-building. The
Media briefing
of May 3 on Secretary of State John Kerry meeting with President Hassan
Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, indicates US
Administration’s ambiguity on state-building in Somalia. While US
Administration accorded diplomatic recognition to the federal government
of Somalia, it also allowed regional actors to dishevel Somalia and
undermine state-building goals. This could fuel new political and social
tensions if not conflicts.
The title of the dissenting policy note is “
If Mayors ruled Somalia-Beyond state-building impasse”
which first reinterprets and then dismisses the views expressed by the
two Nordic diplomats. Professor Ken Menkhaus’ attempt seems to be part
of a larger effort to kill the agenda of the new deal after the crisis
and abysmal performance of Somalia, South Sudan, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Unfortunately, Somalia – the classic example of
failed states- has also become quickly an example for state-building
failure.
Consistently, Professor Ken has been arguing against the restoration
of the Somali State that collapsed in January 1991 on the basis of his
selective, embellished, and recycled narratives not subjected to
rigorous academic and empirical research and analysis. He confidently
predicts that “with or without the $2.3 billion in new deal assistance, Somalia’s government will remain weak and fragile for years to come.” His intense pursue of promoting “hybrid governance in Somalia” is shaped by his following findings against the South Central Somalia:
- Somali political elites in Mogadishu embraced state-building as a
lucrative project, but not as an objective. In addition, Somali leaders
lack not only capacity but political will as well.
- The culture of corruption and deep rooted problems of spoilers among the political and business elites in Mogadishu is endemic.
- The serious problem of insecurity and access in South Central
Somalia makes the principles of inclusivity and local ownership out of
reach by government;
- The legitimacy weakness of any government due to the intensity of
divisions over representation, clan, political Islam, and federalism
insurmountable;
- The realization of social contract between state and citizens in
South Central Somalia is unrealistic in the short term (in generation);
- To find a solution to “Somalia’s wicked problem”
remains almost impossible. Therefore, Somalis and foreign donors have to
accept flawed, contested municipality governments of dubious
legitimacy.
On August 8, 2012, few days after the approval of the provisional
constitution which ended the transition period and established a
permanent government, Professor Ken Menkhaus published a paper titled, “
Somalia’s 20-Year Experiment in Hybrid Governance,”
in which he argued that Somali State cannot be reconstituted in the
foreseeable future and then, he listed the arguments of four schools of
thought about the relevance of informal governance system (hybrid
governance) in Somalia. As one of the multiple synonymous terms of the
concept of “
hybrid governance,” he settled on “
Municipality governance (city-state)”
ruled by Mayors. It is not clear if the concepts of secession and
separation of communities are integral part of hybrid governance which
considers the discussion of national constitution premature subject.
The description associated with municipality governances as location
for multiple clans, best governance for law and order, or basic service
delivery defies reality, economics, demography, legitimacy, security,
and politics and is far from empirical truths. Also, the claim that
accountability is stronger in most municipalities for proximity to
citizens is also demonstrably weak.
However, it is possible that under certain circumstances cities and
towns are less encumbered by clan disputes simply because one sub sub
clan dominates in each city. But it is hard to see how external
assistance denied to a national government could be channeled to
municipal administrations given the rules governing foreign aid, and how
INGOs assistance will improve the livelihood of war devastated and
fragmented country.
It is academically dishonest to argue that donor powers have ever
seriously attempted to peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia. In
fact, Dr. Michael J. Boyle noted that “Somalia has played the
part-both in political practice and political myth- of a testing ground
in which states play out their fantasies out of political order. The
consequence is that Somalia, as a real place with real people, has
rarely been seen on its own terms.” Therefore, the foreign
driven political initiatives in the last 12 years were far more
lucrative projects to donor agencies and their bureaucrats compare to
Somali Elites.
Following a workshop organized by the London School of Economics and
Political Science in collaboration with the University of Antwerp on
Hybrid Governance, Professors Kate Meagher, Tom De Herdt, and Kristof
Titeca have published a briefing article titled, “
Hybrid governance in Africa: Buzzword or paradigm shift?,”
in the African Argument website. The article presents long list of yet
to be answered questions about this new concept sold as “practical and
legitimate governance that works.”
The questions include the role of
academics as promoters or investigators of the new concept, or the
powers that create the hybrid governance when good governance norms have
been disregarded, or if hybrid governance enhances the performance and
legitimacy of the state or erodes them. The professors cautioned against
the assumption that all informal institutions are locally legitimate by
definition as a misreading of local realities.
Another unanswered question is how hybrid governance deals with
public accountability and citizenship rights. The participants of the
workshop noted the growing evidence that hybrid governance does not
always represent good synergistic arrangement between weak (fragile)
states and local institutions. The scholars who attended the workshop
advised the academics promoting hybrid governance to exercise prudence
so that they do not get their hand deep in the dirty.
The consensus on
addressing the problems of fragile states is well spelled out in the New
Deal partnership for effective international development cooperation
between donor powers and fragile states.
By: Mohamed M. Uluso
Controversial Kenyan Somali lawyer Ahmednasir Abdullahi wants the
police to investigate an advocate he claimed threatened him on social
media. Senior counsel said that alleged warning posted on Facebook by Mr
Donald Kipkorir amounts to threats to kill and police should conduct an
investigation.
